New Zealand has a poor health and safety record with alarming rates of workplace injuries and fatalities. 
I Introduction
New Zealand has a poor health and safety record with high levels of workplace injuries and fatalities. Every year approximately one in ten workers will be harmed while at work in New Zealand, 1 whilst every week approximately one or two workers will lose their lives in traumatic accidents at work. 2 New Zealand has a risk tolerant culture full of negative perceptions about workplace health and safety. This culture has meant that too many New Zealander's are at risk of injuries at work, whilst too little is done to prevent harm from occurring. 3 The costs of this "she'll be right" attitude are vast. corresponding legislation in a majority of the states and territories. Western Australia has yet to adopt the Model law and Victoria has indicated that it will not do so.
The first part of the paper explores the motivations for the Bill and introduces the primary duty of care on a Person Conducting a Business or Undertaking (PCBU). Unlike the HSE Act, the focus in the Bill is no longer on the status of the employment relationship. This means better protection for workers, from a wider range of duty holders. Following this the ways in which the Bill seeks to impact corporate behaviour will be analysed. The
Government has set a target of a 25 percent reduction in workplace injury and fatality rates by 2020. 9 Central to achieving this is creating organisational cultures which value health and safety. Corporate and officer responsibility for health and safety is weak under the current regime. This has been identified as a flaw in the system and promoting responsibility at these levels is crucial to turning things around.
The Bill drives responsibility through the introduction of a proactive due diligence duty on officers and stronger deterrence mechanisms. These will be discussed to reveal the drivers of the duties, what they mean for organisations and how they will encourage positive health and safety cultures. Placing obligations on officers means those in the best position to monitor and reduce risks have a legal obligation to do so. The alignment of this duty with personal liability means those with the ability to initiate organisational change have a strong incentive to do so. This is supported by stronger deterrence mechanisms including increased penalties for non-compliance and enhanced worker participation. The final part of the paper assesses the lack of provision for corporate manslaughter. For persistent health and safety offenders this would be the ultimate deterrent, driving organisations to rethink their health and safety attitudes.
The Bill represents a significant shift from the HSE Act. It will require businesses to adopt a greater focus on health and safety. The status quo, "she'll be right" attitude will need to change.
9 MBIE, above n 2, at 1.
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II Background to the Bill Current Law
Prior to 1992 occupational health and safety in New Zealand was controlled by a plethora of prescriptive, sector-specific acts. This regulatory system was seen as complex and overly reliant on external inspection. 10 The HSE Act was enacted to overcome these issues. The
Act, based on the model proposed in the Robens Report, 11 is the principal statute regulating workplace health and safety in New Zealand. 12 Originating in the United Kingdom, the Robens approach places an emphasis on a performance-based rather than compliancebased approach to health and safety. 13 The Act is supported by regulations and Approved
Codes of Practice (ACoPs).
14 These clarify what duties exist and how they are to be complied with in practice.
The object of the Act is to "promote the prevention of harm to all persons at work and other persons in, or in the vicinity of, a place of work. The performance-based system in the HSE Act provides standardisation. It covers most places of work and work hazards, whilst also allowing for flexibility in how workplaces meet their obligations. 21 However as will be highlighted in this paper the current regime is fraught with problems.
Motivations for Change
A major problem with the Act is that it has failed to remain relevant amidst the changing nature of workplaces, working arrangements and increasingly complex supply chains.
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Precarious work including shift-work, self-employment, casual and temporary employment, along with increasing working hours and work intensity has become much more prevalent. The flexibility provided by the HSE Act has led to dire consequences in high risk industries where prescription is warranted. This along with gaps in, and outdated, ACoPs has put the health and safety of many workers at risk. Pike River and make recommendations as to how future tragedies could be prevented.
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The Commission identified a number of underlying causes of the tragedy involving leadership, operational and cultural problems. 31 Overall it found directors and executive managers had pushed for coal production at the expense of workplace health and safety and exposed the workers to unacceptable risks. 32 The directors had little involvement in health and safety management, and had inadequate knowledge of the relevant risks. Sixteen recommendations for change were proposed. 33 One recommendation was that the health and safety responsibilities of directors should be reviewed.
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Independent Task Force
The Taskforce was established by the Minister of Labour with the purpose of reporting on whether the current health and safety system is fit to meet the government's target of reducing workplace injuries and fatalities. 35 The Taskforce identified a number of systematic problems with New Zealand's workplace health and safety. 
The Model Law
The Model Law harmonises workplace health and safety laws in Australia. 55 It was created with the objects of: protecting the health and safety of workers, improving safety outcomes in workplaces, reducing compliance costs and improving efficiency for regulators. 56 The
Model Law reflects a changing attitude towards workplace health and safety; protecting persons involved in work rather than being predicated on the employment relationship. 57 It is the most recent approach to the Robens model of performance based legislation, allocating duties to those best placed to manage them.
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The object of the Act is to "secure the health and safety of workers." 59 This is achieved through various key elements including the imposition of duties of care on PCBUs, the extension of duties towards workers rather than employees only and positive duties on The Bill is based on the premise that a well-functioning health and safety system relies on "participation, leadership and accountability by government, business, and workers".
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Following from the Model Law the purpose of the Bill is to "secure the health and safety of workers and workplaces". 69 When contrasted with the object of the HSE Act, a stronger statutory imperative to ensure proactive workplace health and safety environments is revealed. The Bill increases duties on employers, who will be expected to take more responsibility than under the current HSE Act. An important element of the Bill is that obligations are placed on all persons involved in the supply chain, including those in governance roles. The Bill also increases penalties for non-compliance and improves worker participation, 70 with obligations on PCBUs to consult and engage workers.
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IV Widening of Duties
The Bill imposes health and safety duties on a wider range of persons than under the HSE Act. All those in the best position to manage health and safety risks will have a responsibility to do so. The Bill also expands the group to whom the duties are owed. This duty extends to ensuring that the health and safety of others generally, is not put at risk by the work being done. 73 The duty introduces three key terms which are discussed below.
Persons Conducting a Business or Undertaking
Primary duties within the Bill fall on PCBU's. The term was adopted from the Model Law and is designed to be a broad concept. 74 The intention is that duties will be allocated to those who are in the position to control health and safety risks in the workplace. 75 arrangements. There is a clear shift in focus in the Bill, from an emphasis on the nature of the employment contract towards a focus on the practical working relationship between the parties involved.
Reasonably Practicable
The "reasonably practicable" qualification on PCBU duties is another change in the Bill.
The term is derived from the Model Law and replaces the HSE Act requirement to take "all practicable steps". 86 The determination of what is reasonably practicable in the Model Law is an objective assessment in individual cases. The test is whether the duty-holder met the standard of behaviour expected of a reasonable person in the position of the duty-holder.
It is defined in s 17 of the Bill as:
… reasonably practicable, in relation to a duty to ensure health and safety, means that which is, or was, at a particular time, reasonably able to be done in relation to ensuring health and safety, taking into account and weighing up all relevant matters, including- In practice the change in terminology is unlikely to result in any significant changes. The duty in s 6 of the HSE Act to take all practicable steps has been interpreted as requiring employers to take proactive steps to ensure the safety of employees. 87 However the change does make it clear that risk-based decision making is required over the cost of measures, creating a presumption in favour of health and safety. For PCBUs the inclusion of "grossly disproportionate" means that unless the cost of a health and safety measure is excessive to the risk of harm, the measure will be reasonably practicable and must be taken.
Impact of the Duty
The duty means PCBUs will have to be responsible for the health and safety of a greater number of workers. This means they will have to be vigilant in ensuring they are aware of what duties they owe and to whom. There have been criticisms regarding the primary duty of care and the adoption of the term worker. 88 Although it does provide much needed protection and a focus on health and safety, there is also the potential for confusion and an unnecessary overlap of obligations. Under the definition of workers all volunteers, contractors, subcontractors and their employees need to be treated and consulted by PCBUs like any other worker. There is the potential that the nature of the relationship means that the PCBU has no real control over such workers and this could be unjustly burdensome on some businesses.
On the other hand, the ability of employers to avoid or reduce duties through the use of precarious work arrangements has been described as resulting in a "race to the bottom" of those in decision making positions to place a greater emphasis on health and safety.
Targeting those PCBUs who have direct control over workers is also not the aim of the Bill, rather it focuses on the ability to manage health and safety risks. In the construction industry, a head contractor may not have direct influence over all workers present at a site.
However they do have the ability to minimise the risk of harm through regular maintenance of scaffolding or ensuring pedestrians and vehicles are kept apart. In this way the Bill removes an incentive to enter into the forms of working arrangements that would currently minimise or avoid legal liability under the HSE Act. Industries that use multiple contractors will no longer be able to offload responsibilities as their duty requires them to "consult, cooperate with and co-ordinate activities with all other persons who have a duty in relation to the same matter".
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V Rethinking Corporate Responsibility
Corporate behaviour is influenced by a number of factors including the nature of the industry, workers and those who are in governance roles. 93 Increasing productivity and profitability are key concerns and these shareholder rights are at the forefront of decision making. The current legislative framework is weak on corporate responsibility and accountability for health and safety at work. There is a major hole in the HSE Act which has meant that those at the upper echelons of organisations are able to shy away from health and safety matters. As such organisations often have a "she'll be right" attitude towards health and safety matters, with complacent health and safety cultures. Moreover structures in the current regime, including ACC, mean that when accidents do occur at the workplace, the majority of the costs are not borne by those who benefit from and are in the best position to regulate the risks, but by society. Applying this to Pigou's externalities theory, there are insufficient incentives for businesses to improve health and safety conditions. 94 Legislation is therefore needed to achieve "deterrence efficiency" whereby businesses are incentivised to reduce the damage flowing from the workplace. The lack of corporate responsibility in the current system has been identified as a major flaw. 96 The Bill seeks to rectify this by altering the levers which influence corporate behaviour in such a way that positive health and safety is prioritised. 97 Compelling organisations to take an active role in ensuring compliance and creating workplace cultures which foster and value health and safety, is central to turning things around. The Bill influences corporate and director responsibility in a number of ways. A vital change is the extension of liability to officers. This is complemented by stronger deterrence mechanisms including increased penalties for non-compliance. These changes and the impact they have on corporate behaviour are discussed below.
VI Extension of Liability to Officers
A fundamental change in the Bill is the introduction of a health and safety duty on officers.
Under the current regime there is no specific duty on individual directors to ensure the safety of workers. 98 If a company has committed an offence under the HSE Act directors may only be prosecuted if they have directed, authorised, assented to, acquiesced in or participated in the company's failure. 99 They may also be liable where there is strong evidence that they had clear knowledge that something was unsafe or contrary to the law.
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Such prosecutions have been rare. This is primarily due to the knowledge requirement in the HSE Act which, other than in smaller organisations, is often difficult to satisfy.
Directors are generally more concerned with the governance of the organisation and often lack knowledge of the day-to-day operations. 101 This provision has led to absurd results. 104 The sole-director alone had sign-off on decisions and therefore could not disclaim responsibility. The company was very small and she played much more of an active part in the day-to-day operations than the CEO of Pike River. These results are troubling given, in the former case, the CEO appears no less morally culpable than the sole-director.
The Bill imposes a positive duty on officers to exercise due diligence to achieve workplace health and safety compliance. This represents a significant change from the status quo.
105
Officers will be required to take a far more hands-on approach to health and safety in order to meet this obligation. The intention is that those in governance roles will proactively manage health and safety in the workplace. This continuous obligation on officers, provides much needed accountability in New Zealand's health and safety regime. Liability at this level is important because research has shown that the decisions and leadership of senior management directly impacts upon the health and safety culture of an organisation. 106 This link between officers and achieving desired health and safety outcomes is recognised in the Bill through the imposition of personal duties and liability on officers to effectively manage workplace health and safety.
Definition of Officer
Officer is defined in cl 12 of the Bill. practices are being followed. It follows from this that they should bear the burden of responsibility.
Although the CTU makes a compelling argument, the focus on the Bill seems to be targeting those who have a significant ability to make health and safety a priority.
Extending the definition to include those who participate or influence is unlikely to have a genuine impact on health and safety if such people have no real ability to make changes. It is undesirable to cast the net too widely if doing so would not necessarily result in better health and safety practices or rates of workplace injuries. This is a legitimate concern as demonstrated in Australia where difficulties have arisen when identifying who is considered an officer in organisations. 114 This is a potential rationale for the departure from the definition found in the Model Law.
Due Diligence
Officers are required to exercise due diligence to ensure PCBUs comply with their duties or obligations. 115 Due diligence is described in cl 39 of the Bill and is made up of six components: (2) In this section, due diligence includes taking reasonable steps- (e) to ensure that the PCBU has, and implements, processes for complying with any duty or obligation of the PCBU under this Act; and (f) to verify the provision and use of the resources and processes referred to in paragraphs (c) to (e).
These six components are directly derived from the Model Law. The rationale for these components is that officers lead the way to driving a good health and safety culture.
Officers, as the decision makers, must therefore be informed. 116 To meet the knowledge requirement officers must keep up to date with health and safety matters, including recent developments in law. This extends to gaining an understanding of the risks and hazards involved in a PCBUs business or undertaking. Furthermore, in order for an organisation's health and safety system to be effective it must be well designed. 117 Having first-hand knowledge about the potential hazards involved will pave the way for more effective leadership and an improved focus on health and safety in decision making. Under the current regime, directors are able to ignore or over-look health and safety matters. To comply with the changes officers will have to shift this attitude and health and safety governance will have to be taken as seriously as the other aspects of governance. 118 The due diligence duty requires officers take an active role in the day-to-day operations of an organisation, a significant change from the current regime.
Impact of the Duty
The imposition of a positive directors' duty supports a change in the health and safety culture of organisations from the top down. The narrowing of the definition means that all those at the upper echelons of organisations will be officers, whereas those who do not have the same ability to initiate change such as middle managers or HR are unlikely to come under the definition. It is a much more onerous duty than in the current HSE Act.
Officers will have to take more of an active approach to awareness of health and safety matters and the responsibilities of PCBUs. Officers should ensure they are keep a record 116 At 112. 117 Johnstone and Tooma, above n 55, at 116.
Institute of Directors in New Zealand and MBIE Good Governance Practices Guideline for Managing
Health and Safety Risks (May 2013) at 1.
of their actions in fulfilment of due diligence in order to verify their compliance with the duty if the need arises. This is particularly important as the focus is on whether the particular officer exercised due diligence. An officer cannot discharge their duty by pointing towards another officer who has exercised due diligence. 119 Moreover an officer's liability is not relieved by virtue of a PCBU following their obligations.
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Due diligence requires officers to personally engage in ensuring the other provisions are made out. It will not be enough to merely provide access to resources nor will relying on verification by others. It also requires officers to maintain a state of chronic unease, especially during long periods without health and safety risks. 121 It is these times where PCBUs may become complacent and the risks inherent in the business or undertaking forgotten. Under the Bill officers must ensure this does not happen.
Overall the duty requires proper corporate governance of organisations by officers.
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Failure to comply with the duty may have costly repercussions as the Bill imposes significant penalties if found guilty of an offence. 123 Ignorance will no longer be bliss for officers as under the HSE Act. A high level of consideration of significant issues arising on a day-to-day basis is needed.
VII Stronger Deterrence Mechanisms
In the introductory speech it was said that "good health and safety is good for business".
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Having a good health and safety culture is valued by workers, investors and stakeholders.
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The failure to manage health and safety risks has business costs including direct financial Given the benefits to an organisation of good health and safety practices, it is difficult to discern why it has not been a priority in many organisations. One explanation is the tendency of organisations to prioritise the short term gain over long time gains. Many top decision makers have little appreciation of the risks involved in the work and thus view the anticipation costs associated with health and safety as too great of an expense. This is especially so for high risk industries which, as described above, often have large supply chains with unclear lines of responsibility for health and safety. Increased competition has also been cited as a reason for waning attention to health and safety in some organisations.
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The Bill seeks to secure the health and safety of all workers. Strong deterrence mechanisms are necessary to change behaviours in industries and workplaces where health and safety is regularly put at risk. The Bill increases corporate and officer responsibility through increased penalties for non-compliance and strengthened enforcement provisions. Worker participation is also necessary to drive corporate responsibility and steer positive health and safety cultures.
Penalties
The Taskforce found the low likelihood of inspector visits and risk of prosecution means non-compliance with health and safety is effectively rewarded in New Zealand. systems. 132 The theory of the "least cost avoider" can be applied to describe the reasons for imposing penalties on organisations for poor health and safety. This asserts that accident costs should be allocated to the party in the best position to reduce the risk. 133 In relation to workplace health and safety, those at the top of organisations are in the best position to impose and create safe working conditions. As their prime concern is with productivity and profit, they are strongly influenced by costs. 134 The imposition of penalties for unsafe working conditions means positive workplace health and safety practices are incentivised and directed at those most capable of implementing change.
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New liability structure
The Bill contains a tiered penalty regime. Three categories of offences are introduced in respect of health and safety duties; category one: reckless conduct, category two: failure to comply with a duty that exposes individual to risk of death or serious injury or illness and category three: failure to comply with a duty. 136 The maximum penalty levels for noncompliance are increased from the HSE Act. Category one offences can result in fine of up to $600,000 or a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years on a PCBU or officer, or in the case of body corporates a fine not exceeding $3 million. In comparison under the HSE Act a broadly similar category of offence would result in a fine of up to $500,000
and/ or two years imprisonment. 137 There is also no requirement for any serious injury or fatality in order to prosecute under the Bill. The focus is on whether the duty was complied with or not.
This provides a far greater incentive for officers and PCBUs to ensure health and safety practices. For most organisations, corporate behaviour will be steered towards positive health and safety practices. This is due to the changed duties of officers and PCBUs who have a personal incentive to create a positive health and safety culture. However in the case of defensive organisations it is conceivable that the potential for a few directors to be fined 
Worker Participation
Worker participation is vital to successfully managing health and safety issues in the workplace. 145 Workers have practical experience of daily hazards and are responsible for the hands-on management of health and safety. 146 The Royal Commission identified worker voice and participation as being crucial to creating positive health and safety cultures. 147 With an effective voice, workers have the ability to deter organisations from adopting bad health and safety practices. However this voice is heavily dependent on workers being aware of their rights, meaning effective worker participation is in reality at the discretion of the employer. 148 Often in highly unitary, non-unionised, decentralised, high-turnover industries worker participation in health and safety is neglected; with employers disliking any form of worker voice. This was epitomised in the case of the Pike River disaster. Gaining participation is a major challenge in the organisations described above, small to medium businesses and where insecure employment is prominent.
Under the HSE Act there is a general duty on all employers to give employees reasonable opportunities to participate in improving health and safety. 149 Commonly this is given effect through elected health and safety representatives and joint health and safety committees. 150 However often these mechanisms are missing or poorly implemented.
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The Taskforce also found that workers often view health and safety as a set of paper-based rules relevant only to protect management from liability and stopping them from getting on with their jobs. 152 Consequently poor worker engagement is regarded as a weakness of New Zealand's regime.
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The Bill imposes an overarching duty on PCBUs to consult and involve workers. Worker participation steers positive health and safety practices which should in turn be reflected in corporate behaviour. Similarly an engaged workforce, informed about their rights and the potential risks, will put pressure on the organisation to take responsibility for implementing positive health and safety practices. To support a culture change and drive corporate responsibility, worker behaviour must also change.
VIII Corporate Manslaughter
A critique of the Bill in its current form is the lack of provision for corporate manslaughter.
This has been described as a "gap in the law". 159 There is a strong argument that in cases of workplace death caused by serious systematic failures, holding senior management to account through fines is inadequate. As discussed above, positive health and safety practices are strongly incentivised in the Bill and it is unlikely that a corporate manslaughter provision would have any effect on low-risk businesses. However in the case of persistent health and safety offenders it is arguable whether the Bill will be strong enough to change behaviours. This is especially so in high risk industries where participants have actively sought to avoid from the provisions in the HSE Act.
corporations. 162 This would maximise the "deterrent effect of the criminal law in influencing the behaviour of corporations". 163 It would also better reflect the moral outrage felt by society when a workplace fatality occurs as a result of the employer's gross negligence. 164 However an overhaul of the current law relating to attribution of criminal liability to a corporation would need to occur for any such provision to be effective.
Currently to give rise to liability an offence must be committed by a single individual who is acting on behalf of the company and is its "directing mind and will". 165 Meeting this requirement can be troublesome, especially in larger organisations where decision making is dispersed between various individuals. This requirement would have to change to allow the conduct of various officers to be combined in order to attribute corporate liability.
As it stands the overall exclusion from the Bill will arguably have little effect on corporate behaviour. The provisions mentioned above and overall spirit of the Bill should have a very persuasive effect on organisations; encouraging and driving good health and safety practices. However for high-risk industries corporate manslaughter would be the ultimate deterrent. It is concerning that organisations with poor attitudes towards health and safety are able to escape accountability for worker fatalities. However the Bill does go a long way towards targeting these industries through focusing on those in the best position to manage risks. The increased levels of fines and penalties in the Bill strongly incentivises directors in high risk industries to act safely themselves and also watch out for signs that others are doing the same. 166 Even still corporate manslaughter may be necessary to drive a culture change in some organisations. In the case of persistent health and safety offenders, only time will tell if the Bill goes far enough to impact on corporate behaviour. 
IX Conclusion
The Health and Safety Reform Bill represents a significant move in New Zealand's health and safety regime. The primary duty of care on PCBUs and extension of duties towards all workers represents a positive step forward from the HSE Act. The shift in focus from traditional employer-employee relationships towards a system which recognises the changing nature of work arrangements and the existence of duties at every link in the supply chain, ensures all workers are protected by duty holders. These changes will have a significant effect in high risk industries such as forestry, where the current regime has failed to provide an incentive to take responsibility for ensuring safe practices. The Bill demands a much needed change in how these industries view and manage health and safety.
The Bill encourages positive workplace health and safety cultures through the extension of liability to officers and stronger deterrence mechanisms. This paper asserted that corporate and officer responsibility is essential to turning things around in New Zealand. Officers, as the key decision makers, have the ability to create positive health and safety cultures and initiate change. The Bill targets those at the top of organisations, ensuring all those in the best position to manage risks are legally obligated to do so. The alignment of personal liability for health and safety with officers governance role means effectively managing workplace health and safety is prioritised. This is supported by stronger deterrence mechanisms including higher penalties for non-compliance, strengthened enforcement powers and worker participation. Although the lack of provision for corporate manslaughter does represent a gap in the law, for the majority of organisations and industries the Bill in its current form is comprehensive enough to drive proactive health and safety practices.
Overall the Bill should have a significant impact on corporate behaviour and New
Zealand's health and safety culture. It requires all those in the best position to manage risks to take responsibility for health and safety and "stop and think" about risks; putting health and safety issues at the front of decision making. The Bill challenges the "she'll be right" attitude and paves the way for a regime where all New Zealander's go to work free from the risk of injuries or death.
